Qualitative identity refers to the properties or qualities of a thing, such as its shape, color, or size. Numerical identity, on the other hand, refers to the unique individual identity of a thing. An example of two numerically distinct items that are qualitatively identical would be two identical books with different ISBN numbers. In the case of photographs, they could be of qualitatively different but numerically identical subjects if one photo is taken from a close-up angle while the other is taken from a distance, resulting in different perspectives and details captured in each photo.
The problem of personal identity is the question of what keeps a person numerically identical to themselves over a lifetime despite potentially undergoing drastic qualitative changes. For example, a person who has been turned into a zombie or a werewolf undergoes significant physical and mental changes, and it is philosophically questionable whether they still exist as the same person after undergoing these changes. Similarly, the famous case of Phineas Gage, who survived a traumatic brain injury that resulted in significant changes to his personality and behavior, raises questions about the continuity of his personal identity.
The brain criterion of personal identity states that what makes a person who they are is their brain. This is because the brain is the physical organ responsible for a person’s thoughts, memories, and actions, and it is what distinguishes one person from another.
The memory criterion of personal identity claims that what makes a person who they are are their memories. This includes both explicit memories, such as recollections of specific events and experiences, as well as implicit memories, such as habits and learned skills. However, this criterion raises the question of whether a person who cannot remember certain parts of their life, such as a one year-old child, can still be considered the same person.
In the movie Freaky Friday, after Anna and Tess eat the cursed fortune cookie, the brain and memory criterion of personal identity would indicate that Anna inhabits LL’s body and Tess inhabits JLC’s body. This is because the cursed fortune cookie swapped their memories between their brains, but did not swap their brains between their skulls. Therefore, Anna still has her own brain with her own memories in LL’s body, and Tess still has her own brain with her own memories in JLC’s body.
Personal identity is both symmetric and transitive, which means that if A is identical to B and B is identical to C, then A is also identical to C. This is similar to the mathematical concept of transitive relations, where if a=b and b=c, then a=c. Other examples of transitive and symmetric relations include equality and similarity. An example of a relation that is neither transitive nor symmetric is the “greater than” relation in mathematics, where a>b and b>c does not necessarily mean a>c.
The transitivity of personal identity solves the problem of how an old person can be personally identical with a one year-old child eighty years ago, even if they have no memories in common and their bodies have no cells in common. This is because the transitivity of personal identity implies that if the old person is identical to the child at one year old, and the child at one year old is identical to the old person at the present time, then the old person is also identical to themselves at the present time.
According to Derek Parfit, a “dividing” case occurs when a person undergoes a highly innovative form of brain surgery in which their brain is divided into two separate halves, each of which is then implanted into a separate body. This scenario is similar to the way in which an amoeba can divide into two separate organisms, each of which is capable of functioning independently.
Parfit believes that, in such a case, the original whole-brained person would be identical to neither of the two resulting half-brained people. Instead, he argues that each of the two half-brained people would be a distinct individual with their own separate identity. This is because, according to Parfit, a person’s identity is determined by their psychological continuity, which is the connectedness of their mental states and experiences over time. In the case of brain surgery, the original person would no longer have psychological continuity, as their mental states and experiences would be divided between the two resulting individuals.
Step Eight
In this hypothetical scenario, the clone with your memories would not be you. While the clone would have all of your memories, it would not have your consciousness or sense of self. Your consciousness, like your memories, is also the product of patterns of neural activity in your brain, and it is not clear that it could be transferred to a new brain in this way.
As for whether or not I would agree to the procedure, it would depend on the details. If the procedure were guaranteed to be successful and the clone would truly have all of my memories and consciousness, I might consider it. However, the fact that the procedure would kill my original brain is a major deterrent, and I would want to be sure that the benefits of the procedure outweighed the risks. Additionally, I would have to consider the ethical implications of creating a clone with my memories, and whether or not it would be fair to the clone to be created with someone else’s memories and no memories of its own. Ultimately, I would need to weigh all of these factors carefully before making a decision.
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